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Abstract
Clause-embedding predicates come in three major varieties: (i) responsive predicates
(e.g. know) are compatible with both declarative and interrogative complements; (ii)
rogative predicates (e.g. wonder) are only compatible with interrogative complements;
and (iii) anti-rogative predicates (e.g. hope) are only compatible with declarative com-
plements. It has been suggested that these selectional properties are at least partly
semantic in nature. In particular, it has been proposed that the anti-rogativity of neg-
raising predicates like believe comes from the triviality in meaning that would arise
with interrogative complements. This paper puts forward a similar semantic explana-
tion for non-veridical preferential predicates such as hope, which are anti-rogative,
unlike their veridical counterparts such as be happy, which are responsive.
Keywords Selectional restrictions · Attitude predicates · Clausal complementation ·
Question embedding · Preferential predicates
1 Introduction
Clause-embedding predicates can be classified into three types (Grimshaw 1979;
Lahiri 2002; Theiler et al. 2019):
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• Responsive predicates, which can embed both declarative and interrogative com-
plements, e.g. know.
• Rogative predicates, which can only embed interrogative complements, e.g.
wonder.
• Anti-rogative predicates, which can only embed declarative complements, e.g.
believe.
The main question we would like to tackle in this paper is how this variation should
be accounted for. One possibility is to assume that each clause-embedding predicate
comes with a lexical specification as to what kind of clause it syntactically selects for.
This type of approach, however, is unsatisfactory on its own, given the stability and pre-
dictability of larger selectional patterns observed both intra- and cross-linguistically:
predicates that have similar meanings generally exhibit the same selectional proper-
ties. For instance, we would like to explain why we do not find a version of know that
is rogative or a version of wonder that is responsive. Considerations like this are taken
as evidence that the core selectional properties are due to the lexical semantics of the
predicates, although idiosyncratic syntactic properties are not necessarily excluded
(Grimshaw 1979; Pesetsky 1982, 1991; White and Rawlins 2016).
Recent developments in the area of question semantics have deepened our under-
standing of the semantic nature of complement selection, but there still are some
open issues. To illustrate, let us first consider the following type-theoretic approach.
One of the standard views of question semantics, championed by Karttunen (1977)
and others, holds that declarative and interrogative clauses denote different kinds of
semantic objects; specifically, declarative clauses denote propositions, while interrog-
ative clauses denote sets of propositions. In this setting, anti-rogative predicates like
believe are analyzed as those whose denotations exclusively select for propositions,
and rogative predicates like wonder as those whose denotations exclusively select for
sets of propositions, as illustrated in (1). Throughout this paper, we write τˆ for the
type of sets of type-τ objects.1
(1) a. believe  = λp〈s,t〉.λx .λw. believew(x, p)
b. wonder  = λQ
̂〈s,t〉.λx .λw. wonderw(x, Q)
This analysis needs to make an extra assumption about responsive predicates, which
are compatible with both types of embedded clauses. The most popular take on this
is that when responsive predicates combine with an interrogative clause, the meaning
of the interrogative clause is converted to a specific proposition that represents an
‘answer’ to the question (Heim 1994; Dayal 1996; Beck and Rullmann 1999; Spector
and Egré 2015). We will put aside for the moment the interesting but complicated
issue of what counts as an appropriate answer to a question (see Sect. 4.2), but one
issue that arises here is that if any such mechanism that converts sets of propositions
to propositions is available, it becomes unclear why anti-rogative predicates cannot
combine with interrogative clauses. That is, just as (2a) means roughly ‘John doesn’t
know the true answer to the question Who danced?’, (2b) should be able to mean
something like ‘John doesn’t believe the true answer to the question Who danced?’.
1 Since the set of partial functions of type 〈σ, t〉 is not isomorphic to the set of subsets of Dσ , we will
explicitly distinguish sets and their characteristic functions.
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(2) a. John doesn’t know who danced.
b. *John doesn’t believe who danced.
Some recent theories of question semantics do not make a type distinction between
declarative and interrogative clauses (Ciardelli et al. 2013; Uegaki 2015; Theiler et al.
2018). On these accounts, both declarative and interrogative clauses denote sets of
propositions, and the difference between declarative and interrogative clauses boils
down to whether or not the denotation is inquisitive (where a clausal meaning is
inquisitive if it contains multiple alternatives, i.e., maximum propositions with respect
to entailment, and non-inquisitive if it contains only one alternative). In this setting,
rogative predicates can be analyzed as those that exclusively select for inquisitive
contents, anti-rogative predicates as those that exclusively select for non-inquisitive
contents, and responsive predicates as those that are insensitive to inquisitiveness.
Concretely, these restrictions could be encoded as sortal presuppositions, as in (3).
(3) a. believe  = λQ
̂〈s,t〉.λw : ¬inquisitive(Q).λx . believew(x, Q)
b. wonder  = λQ
̂〈s,t〉.λw : inquisitive(Q).λx . wonderw(x, Q)
c. be certain  = λQ
̂〈s,t〉.λx .λw. certainw(x, Q)
For such a theory to be truly explanatory, however, it needs to be able to predict which
predicates have what restrictions, but this turns out to be not at all trivial. For instance,
be certain and believe have very similar meanings, but why is it that the former is
insensitive to inquisitiveness, while the latter is sensitive to it?
Recently, Theiler et al. (2019) and Mayr (2019) have proposed a partial answer
to this question. As originally noticed by Zuber (1982), neg-raising predicates are
generally anti-rogative (e.g. believe, think, expect, assume, presume, reckon, advis-
able, desirable, likely). To explain this generalization, Theiler et al. (2019) and Mayr
(2019) put forward semantic accounts according to which such predicates give rise
to logically trivial interpretations with interrogative complements, due to their neg-
raising property. We do not go into the details of these accounts here, but we think
such semantic explanations are conceptually attractive, as they reduce the selectional
properties of these predicates to an independently observed semantic property.
One limitation of these accounts, however, is that they only explain a subset of anti-
rogative predicates. That is, while neg-raising predicates seem to be all anti-rogative,
not all anti-rogative predicates are neg-raising. Concretely, predicates like hope, wish,
fear, deny, and regret are not neg-raising but are still anti-rogative.
Thus, while there is a conceptual advantage in explaining anti-rogativity in seman-
tic terms, such explanations are not applicable to all anti-rogative predicates. This
of course does not mean that these accounts should be dismissed altogether. Rather,
we think it is plausible that different anti-rogative predicates are anti-rogative for dif-
ferent semantic reasons. In this paper, we will develop a semantic analysis of the
anti-rogativity of non-veridical preferential predicates like hope. If successful, it will
complement the aforementioned analyses of the anti-rogativity of neg-raising predi-
cates.
To be clear, we will only attempt to explain the selectional properties of predicates
like hope that show the following properties: their semantics is preferential/order-
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based and semantically focus sensitive (see Sect. 2 for details). For the rest of this
paper, we will call predicates that show these semantic properties simply preferential
predicates. As a consequence, there will still be some anti-rogative predicates that are
unaccounted for both by theories of neg-raising predicates and by our theory, such as
regret and deny. We believe their anti-rogativity requires yet another explanation.2
The idea we will pursue is similar in nature to the aforementioned accounts of neg-
raising predicates: preferential predicates like hope are prohibited from combining
with interrogative clauses because such combinations are bound to result in trivial
meanings. We will furthermore show that this analysis also accounts for the fact that
their veridical counterparts, like be happy, are responsive.3 More generally, our analy-
sis is intended to derive the following empirical hypothesis regarding the relationship
between the lexical semantics of clause-embedding predicates and their selectional
restrictions:
(4) Hypothesis: All non-veridical preferential predicates are anti-rogative.
At this point, the scope of the current paper should be made explicit. Our goal is to
make observations based on a number of English predicates that align with the hypothe-
sis in (4) and to formulate an explicit semantic analysis of the selectional restriction that
derives it. It is beyond the scope of this paper to evaluate the hypothesis with respect
to the entire English lexicon, let alone with respect to lexicons cross-linguistically.
This said, we submit that formulating such a semantic analysis has substantial empir-
ical and theoretical implications. For one, (4) makes testable empirical predictions
about the selectional restrictions of prototypically preferential predicates that are non-
veridical, such as hope, prefer, and fear. The predictions are falsifiable and empirically
supported, as we will claim. Furthermore, these predicates are not accounted for by
previous analyses. Also, our hypothesis, if correct, contributes to the existing literature
by providing another empirical domain in which the theoretical notion of preferential
predicates is useful, alongside monotonicity (Heim 1992), mood selection (Villalta
2008), interpretation of epistemic modals in the complement (Anand and Hacquard
2013), incompatibility with whether-questions (Romero 2015), etc.
The structure of the present paper is as follows. In Sect. 2 we will present our
main empirical observation that non-veridical preferential predicates are anti-rogative
while their veridical counterparts are responsive. We will also be explicit about what
predicates fall into the scope of our analysis and what predicates don’t. In Sect. 3, we
will develop our core account, which we will refine in Sect. 4. Sect. 5 is devoted to
discussion of the role of prepositions, most notably about, in the present phenomenon.
Sect. 6 concludes.
2 As a reviewer has pointed out to us, the anti-rogativity of regret might not be cross-linguistically stable, as
the German bedauern ‘regret’ seems to accept interrogative complements, as pointed out by Schwabe and
Fittler (2009) and Grohne (2017). If regret and bedauern have the same relevant lexical-semantic properties,
the pair would provide an argument against an explanation for their selectional restrictions that is solely
based on the lexical semantics of the predicates. This is left for future work.
3 We say that a clause-embedding predicate V is veridical if α V s that p entails p. Factivity is a special
case of veridicality. An embedding predicate V is factive if α V s that p presupposes p.
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2 Preferential predicates and their selectional properties
Following previous studies on the typology of attitude predicates (Anand and Hac-
quard 2013; Bolinger 1968; Heim 1992; Villalta 2008; Rubinstein 2012; Harner 2016,
among others), we recognize a class of attitude predicates that are focus sensitive and
express comparative meanings about focus alternatives, which we simply call prefer-
ential predicates in this paper. They include desideratives (e.g. hope, wish, want, fear,
be surprised, be happy) and directives (e.g. demand, advise, encourage). Our main
observations at this point are based on the following predicates:
(5) a. Non-veridical preferential predicates:
hope, wish, expect, want, be eager, aspire, fear, desire, prefer
b. Veridical preferential predicates:
be surprised, be annoyed, be glad, be happy, like, love, hate
All of these predicates are compatible with declarative complements, as in (6).
(6) a. Ben hopes/wishes that Becky is invited to the party.
b. Chris expects/fears that Cathy is invited to the party.
c. Dorothy is surprised/annoyed/glad/happy that Daniel will give a presenta-
tion.
Among these, the ones that are veridical/factive with declarative complements are
responsive and are compatible with interrogative complements, as in (7).4
(7) a. Andy is surprised (at/by) which students are invited to the party.
b. Ben is happy/glad ?(about) which students are invited to the party.
c. Chris liked/hated which students were invited to the party.
The non-veridical ones, on the other hand, are anti-rogative, and incompatible with
interrogative complements.
(8) a. *Ben hopes/wishes which students will be invited to the party.
b. *Chris expects/fears how many students will be invited to the party.
Note here that the which-NP clauses in the above examples cannot have a free-relative
interpretation (Huddleston and Pullum 2002: 398). That these predicates can embed
genuine interrogative complements (as opposed to free relatives) can be further con-
firmed by checking the compatibility with wh-else (Ross 1967: 38), which also cannot
be interpreted as a free relative.
(9) a. Andy is surprised (at/by) who else is invited to the party.
b. Ben is glad/happy ?(about) who else is invited to the party.
c. Chris liked/hated who else was invited to the party.
The contrast between veridical and non-veridical preferential predicates with
respect to interrogative complements, as illustrated in the above examples, is the
4 Some of these cases sound better with a preposition like about, but we should be careful as about itself
might make an interrogative complement available. This issue will be taken up in Sect. 5.
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empirical focus of the current paper. However, it should be noted that not all types
of interrogative complements are compatible with veridical preferential predicates, as
previously observed (Karttunen 1977). That is, they are incompatible with whether-
complements:
(10) a. *Andy is surprised (at/by) whether Alice is invited to the party.
b. *Ben is glad/happy (about) whether Becky is invited to the party.
c. *Chris liked/hated whether Cathy was invited to the party.
We assume that the pattern exemplified in (10) receives an explanation independent
from our analysis of the anti-rogativity of non-veridical preferentials. In particular, our
final analysis of preferential predicates presented in Sect. 3.4 below is compatible with
Romero’s (2015) account of the incompatibility between preferential predicates and
whether-complements. For other existing accounts of the same puzzle, see e.g. d’Avis
(2002), Abels (2004), Guerzoni (2007), Sæbø (2007), Nicolae (2013), Roelofsen et al.
(2019), and Roelofsen (2019).
All in all, the data presented above corroborate our hypothesis that non-veridical
preferential predicates are anti-rogative and their veridical/factive counterparts are
responsive. Before moving on to our analysis, several further remarks are in order.
2.1 Focus sensitivity
Firstly, we would like to stress that our empirical generalization is meant to be lim-
ited to what we call preferential predicates, which have preference-based semantics
and are focus sensitive in the semantic sense. Admittedly, whether a given predicate
has preference-based meaning is not always pre-theoretically clear (cf. Portner and
Rubinstein 2012). On the other hand, focus sensitivity is a very useful criterion for our
purposes. That is, as many authors have noted (Villalta 2008; Rubinstein 2012; Romero
2015; Harner 2016), the attitude predicates in question change truth conditions based
on the focus structure of the embedded sentence. Here’s an example illustrating this
(modeled after Romero 2015, (13)):
(11) Context: Natasha does not like to teach logic and prefers to teach syntax.
She is not allowed to teach both. This year, it is likely that she needs to teach
logic, and if so, she prefers to do so in the morning, as she prefers to do all
her teaching in the morning.
a. Natasha hopes that she’ll teach logic in the MORning. true
b. Natasha hopes that she’ll teach LOgic in the morning. false
Similarly, Romero (2015) provides the following example for surprise:
(12) Context: Lisa knew that syntax was going to be taught. She expected syntax
to be taught by John, since he is the best syntactician around. Also, she expected
syntax to be taught on Mondays, since that is the rule.
a. It surprised Lisa that John taught syntax on TUESdays. true
b. It surprised Lisa that JOHN taught syntax on Tuesdays. false
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These observations led the authors cited above to postulate semantics for preferential
predicates that compare the focus alternatives determined by the focus structure of the
embedded sentence. We will discuss a particular version of this idea due to Romero
(2015) in the next section.
It is important to note that these predicates exhibit truth-conditional effects of focus,
not just pragmatic effects of focus, which presumably all predicates exhibit one way or
another (see Harner 2016 for more discussion on this). For instance, a preference-based
analysis for decide that compares different alternatives might appear promising.5 If
decide is a preferential predicate, it will be a counter-example to our generalization,
because it is not veridical but is responsive.
(13) a. Natasha decided that she’ll go to LONdon this summer.
b. Natasha decided where she’ll go this summer.
The idea is that decide in (13a) compares different places Natasha could go to this
summer.
However, according to our definition of preferential predicates, decide doesn’t count
as one, because it does not seem to trigger truth-conditional effects of focus. Con-
cretely, consider the following example.
(14) Context: Natasha is required to teach logic, but she’s free to choose when
to teach it. However, if she teaches anything in the morning, it needs to be
logic. In the end, she decides to teach logic in the morning and syntax in the
afternoon.
a. Natasha decided that she’ll teach logic in the MORning. true
b. Natasha decided that she’ll teach LOgic in the morning. ?true
Crucially, in this context it is not up to Natasha to decide what to teach if she teaches in
the morning. If decide were truth-conditionally focus sensitive, (14b) should be false,
but it does not seem to be. Rather, it’s true yet infelicitous (which is presumably the
pragmatic effect of focus here).
Our account below will crucially rely on truth-conditional focus sensitivity. There-
fore, predicates like decide simply fall outside of our analysis here.
2.2 Infinitival complements
Our second remark concerns infinitival complements. Many preferential predicates
take infinitival complements, in addition to finite ones (some, such as want, be eager,
and aspire, are in fact more natural with infinitival complements than with finite
ones). As expected from our hypothesis, non-veridical preferential predicates that are
compatible with infinitival complements are only compatible with declarative (non-
wh) ones and not with interrogative (wh) ones, as shown in the following examples.
5 We thank a reviewer for directing our attention to decide.
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(15) a. Alice prefers to invite Andrew to the party.
b. Ben hopes/wishes to invite Becky to the party.
c. Chris wants/is eager to invite Cathy to the party.
(16) a. *Alice prefers (about) who to invite to the party.
b. *Ben hopes/wishes (about) who to invite to the party.
c. *Chris wants/is eager (about) who to invite to the party.
What is unexpected, however, is that veridical preferential predicates that are compat-
ible with infinitival complements are also only compatible with declarative ones, as
illustrated in (17).
(17) a. *Alice is surprised (at/by) (about) who to invite to the party.
b. *Ben is glad/happy (about) who to invite to the party.
c. *Chris liked/hated (about) who to invite to the party.
Our analysis will focus on finite complements, and will not have much to say about
infinitival complements. However, it will only entail that non-veridical preferential
predicates cannot take interrogative complements; it remains compatible with the pos-
sibility that the partial anti-rogativity of veridical preferential predicates with infinitival
complements observed here is due to some other, yet unknown reason, which is in line
with our general idea that anti-rogativity may arise from several different factors.
2.3 Say
Thirdly, a reviewer asks a related question about the predicate say. They wonder if
say with an infinitival complement, which seems to have directive focus-sensitive
semantics, is a counterexample to our generalization, as it is non-veridical but
responsive.
(18) a. John said to leave at SIX.
b. John said when to leave.
But it is not evident that the directive meaning is coming from the embedding predicate
say here. That is, say indeed expresses directive meaning when combined with an
infinitival complement, but not when combined with a finite complement. Rather, to
paraphrase the directive meaning of (18) with a finite complement, a separate modal
like should is required.
(19) a. John said that we should leave at six.
b. John said when we should leave.
We think it would be desirable to maintain the same semantics of the predicate say
with both finite and infinitival complements. If so, at least part of the directive meaning
of (18) should be attributed to the modality of the infinitival clause. It follows that say
itself does not encode directive meaning and consequently is outside the scope of our
generalization.
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3 Why veridicality matters for preferential predicates
In this section we will spell out our explanation as to why non-veridical preferential
predicates are anti-rogative while veridical ones may be responsive. The core idea is
that non-veridical preferential predicates with interrogative clauses give rise to trivial
meaning while veridical preferential predicates do not, regardless of the complement
clause type. We will formalize this using (i) a uniform approach to clause embedding
(Ciardelli et al. 2013; Uegaki 2015; Theiler et al. 2018) (Sect. 3.1) and (ii) a degree-
based semantics for preferentials (Romero 2015) (Sect. 3.2).
Our analysis will crucially rely on the lexical denotations of clause-embedding
predicates. It is important therefore to make explicit a certain methodological principle
which we follow in determining lexical denotations of specific clause-embedding
predicates. The principle goes as follows:
(20) Posit only observable lexical-semantic variation:
For any pair of predicates V and V ′ we posit lexical-semantic variation
between V and V ′ only if this lexical-semantic variation can be motivated by
the truth conditions of acceptable sentences x V s ϕ and x V ′s ϕ, where
x is a DP and ϕ is a clausal complement.
In other words, once we conclude that V and V ′ have certain lexical denotations based
on observations about the truth conditions of (acceptable) sentences with a certain
clause type (e.g., a declarative complement), the denotations will not be revised based
on a further observation that V and V ′ differ in their compatibility with another clause
type (e.g., an interrogative complement). The rationale behind this principle is to
ensure that our account of selectional restrictions with respect to a certain clause
type is explanatory in the sense that it is based on independently motivated lexical
semantics. Below, when making theoretical decisions about lexical denotations, we
will refer back to this principle.
3.1 A uniform approach to clausal embedding
We follow Ciardelli et al. (2013), Uegaki (2015), Theiler et al. (2018) and take a
uniform approach to clause embedding where both declarative and interrogative com-
plements denote sets of propositions and all clause-embedding predicates take sets of
propositions as arguments. We assume that declarative sentences denote singleton sets
of propositions, while interrogative clauses denote non-singleton sets of propositions.6
(See Sect. 4.2 for the treatment of exhaustivity in embedded questions.)
(21) a.  that Alice jumped  = { λw. jumpw(a) }
b. whether Alice jumped  = { λw. jumpw(a), λw. ¬jumpw(a) }
c. who jumped  = { λw. jumpw(x) | x ∈ D } ∪ { λw. ¬∃x[jumpw(x)] }
6 We could include all non-trivial stronger propositions in the denotations, as in certain versions of Inquis-
itive Semantics, but such structure is unnecessary for the purposes of this paper.
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We assume that a declarative complementizer converts a proposition into a singleton
set containing the proposition.7
In this setting, representational predicates like be certain and know have an exis-
tential semantics, as in (22).
(22) a. be certain  = λQ
̂〈s,t〉.λx .λw. ∃p ∈ Q[certainw(x, p)]
b.  know  = λQ
̂〈s,t〉.λx .λw : ∃p ∈ Q[p(w)]. ∃p ∈ Q[p(w) ∧
knoww(x, p)]
All clause-embedding predicates take a set of propositions, so they are all type-
compatible with both interrogative and declarative complements. For instance, the
denotation of believe is of the same type as that of know:
(23) believe  = λQ
̂〈s,t〉.λx .λw. ∃p ∈ Q[believew(x, p)]
Following the methodological principle in (20), we do not posit any lexical seman-
tic variation between be certain and believe beyond what is observable from their
behaviors with declarative complements. In particular, both be certain and believe
involve existential quantification over propositions because (a) we have analyzed be
certain as having an existential semantics, given the truth conditions with interrogative
complements, and (b) the truth conditions of be certain and believe with declarative
complements do not motivate variation in the quantificational force between the two
predicates. The anti-rogativity of believe, therefore, needs to be explained by other
means than type incompatibility. As mentioned before, see Theiler et al. (2019) and
Mayr (2019) for proposals to reduce it to its neg-raising property.
3.2 Degree-based semantics for preferential predicates
To analyze preferential predicates, we follow Romero’s (2015) degree-based seman-
tics, which in turn is based on Villalta’s (2008) analysis. As will be discussed later,
this degree-based semantics offers an attractive account of the anti-rogativity of
non-veridical preferential predicates, involving a reasonable assumption about the
semantics of degree constructions in general.
As noted above in Sect. 2.1, preferential predicates show truth-conditional focus
sensitivity, which led previous authors to propose that these predicates compare focus
alternatives determined by the focus structure of the embedded clause. The degree-
based semantics for preferential predicates by Romero (2015) builds on this insight,
and treats the focus structure of the complement as providing the comparison class
against which the subject’s preferences are compared. Concretely, assuming the Rooth-
ian alternative semantics for focus (Rooth 1992), the context is assumed to provide a
set of alternatives C , which preferential predicates refer to.8 For example, the seman-
7 We could alternatively assume throughout a system akin to Hamblin Semantics, where all denotations
are sets (Hamblin 1973; Kratzer and Shimoyama 2002).
8 We assume for the sake of exposition that focus association with preferential predicates is conventional (in
the sense of Beaver and Clark 2008), but nothing crucial hinges on this. See Romero (2015) for discussion.
Also, to avoid clutter, we conflate variables in the object language and meta-language.
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tics for be happy looks like (24), where Pref is a degree function defined in (25) and
θ(C) is the threshold degree given the comparison set C .9 We will have more to say
on the threshold function θ below.
(24) be happyC w = λp〈s,t〉.λx .λw : p(w) ∧ believew(x, p) ∧ p ∈ C .
Prefw(x, p) > θ(C)
(25) a. Prefw(x, p) := the maximum degree to which x prefers p at w
b. θ(C) := the standard threshold given the comparison class C
In prose: x is happy that p presupposes that p is true, that x believes that p, and
that p is a member of the focus alternatives C , and asserts that the degree to which x
prefers p at w is greater than the threshold given C . As Romero (2015) argues, the last
presupposition—that p ∈ C—is an instance of a presupposition existing in degree
constructions in general, namely that the comparison class includes the comparison
term.
Note that (24) assumes that be happy semantically selects for a single proposition.
To reformulate the analysis to fit the uniform approach to clausal embedding introduced
in the previous section, we make the predicate select for a set of propositions and relate
the subject and the set using (25) via existential quantification:10
(26) be happyC w = λQ
̂〈s,t〉.λx .λw : ∃p∈ Q[p(w)∧believew(x, p)∧p ∈ C].
∃p′′ ∈ Q
[
p′′(w) ∧ believew(x, p′′) ∧ p′′ ∈ C∧
Prefw(x, p′′) > θ(C)
]
Let us see how (26) works with concrete interrogative and declarative complements.
First, following Beck (2006), we take wh-items to be necessarily focused. Given this, in
our semantics the focus semantic value of a wh-complement turns out to be equivalent
to its ordinary semantic value, as in (27).11 Letting Q be the focus/ordinary semantic
value of the interrogative complement, be happy with an interrogative complement
can be analyzed as in (28):
(27) Q := who jumped o = whoF jumped  f
9 The formulation in (24) uses a measure function Pref that maps individual-proposition pairs to degrees
rather than to relations between degrees and individuals/propositions as done in Romero (2015). This is
only for presentational reasons (the former formulation results in shorter formulae); nothing crucial hinges
on this choice.
10 In (26), to avoid the ‘binding problem’ concerning the existential quantifications in the presupposition
and the assertion, the content of the presupposition is repeated in the scope of the existential quantification
in the assertion. See Spector and Egré (2015) for a similar solution to the binding problem in the domain
of question embedding.
11 As pointed out to us by Henriëtte de Swart (p.c.), this equivalence might not hold when number mor-
phology is involved. Concretely, while which student  ranges over singular individuals, its focus value
which student  f might include plural individuals, in which case the ordinary semantic value will be a
subset of the focus semantic value. As far as we can see, however, there is no empirical reason to assume
that which student  f contains plural individuals. Technically, we could exclude plural individuals by
assuming a type distinction between singular and plural individuals, such that singular individuals are type e
while plural individuals are type ê. See footnote 17 for another technical way of excluding plural individuals
from the focus value.
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(28)  John is happyC (about) [whoF jumped]∼C o
= λw : ∃p∈Q
[
p(w) ∧ p ∈ C
∧believew( j, p)
]
.
∃p′′ ∈Q
[
p′′(w) ∧ believew( j, p′′) ∧ p′′ ∈ C
∧Prefw( j, p′′) > θ(C)
]
Given the definition of the ∼-operator in (29) (Romero 2015, cf. Rooth 1992), C in
(28) is constrained as in (30).
(29) α∼C o is defined only if C ⊆ α  f ; if defined, α∼C o = α o
(30) C ⊆ who jumped  f = Q
All in all, (28) presupposes that there is a true answer of Q which John believes, and
asserts that a true answer of Q which John believes is such that he prefers it to a greater
extent than the standard threshold given the alternatives in C , which in turn is a subset
of Q.
Next, a declarative-embedding sentence would be analyzed as in (31), with
the variable C constrained by the focus structure as in (32). Here, we let A :=
λw. jumpedw(a).
(31)  John is happyC that [AliceF jumped]∼C o
= λw : ∃p∈{A}
[
p(w) ∧ p ∈ C
∧believew( j, p)
]
.
∃p′′ ∈{A}
[
p′′(w) ∧ believew( j, p′′) ∧ p′′ ∈ C∧
Prefw( j, p′′) > θ(C)
]
= λw : A(w) ∧ A ∈ C ∧ believew( j, A).
A(w) ∧ believew( j, A) ∧ A ∈ C ∧ Prefw( j, A) > θ(C)
(32) C ⊆  that [Alice]F jumped  f = Q
That is, (31) presupposes that Alice jumped and that John believes that Alice jumped,
and asserts that John prefers Alice’s jumping to a greater extent than the threshold
given the alternatives in C , which again is constrained by Q.
Thus, the degree-based analysis provides a straightforward account of both declar-
ative and interrogative complementation under veridical preferential predicates.
Romero (2015) shows that the degree-based analysis enables an attractive account
of two puzzles concerning veridical preferential predicates: (i) incompatibility with
whether-complements12 and (ii) (typical) incompatibility with strongly-exhaustive
embedded questions. Another virtue of the degree-based analysis is that (with suitable
assumptions) it can account for the behavior of preferential predicates as gradable
predicates, as in their occurrence in comparatives, e.g. (33).
(33) a. Chris is happier that Alice jumped than Bill is.
b. Chris liked/hated that Alice jumped more than Bill did.
12 More precisely, Romero’s (2015) analysis enables an account of the incompatibility of preferentials
with alternative-question whether-complements. To account for their incompatibility with polar-question
whether-complements, Romero has to make additional assumptions, e.g. that polar questions involve an
elliptical or not and thus are structurally equivalent to alternative questions.
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3.3 The semantics of non-veridical preferential predicates
Building on the semantics for veridical preferentials in the previous section, we propose
the following semantics for a non-veridical preferential, such as hope:
(34) hopeC o = λQ
̂〈s,t〉.λx .λw : ∃p∈ Q[p ∈ C].∃p′′ ∈ Q[p′′ ∈ C ∧
Prefw(x, p′′) > θ(C)]
In contrast to the veridical preferential be happy in (26), which requires that the
preferred answer is true and is believed by the subject, the non-veridical preferential
hope in (34) lacks such requirements. The body of the function simply states that there
is an answer (which is also a member of C) that the subject prefers to a greater extent
than the threshold given C . Again, following the methodological principle in (20),
we do not posit any lexical semantic variation between veridical and non-veridical
preferential predicates beyond what is observable in their behavior with declarative
complements. This is why we analyze hope as involving an existential quantification
over propositions in (34).
With a declarative complement, (34) derives the meaning that the subject prefers
the proposition denoted by the complement to a greater degree than the threshold given
focus alternatives. Here is a concrete example. Again, let A := λw. jumpedw(a).
(35)  John hopesC that [AliceF jumped]∼C w = λw : A ∈ C . Prefw( j, A) >
θ(C)
On the other hand, the meaning predicted for (34) with an interrogative complement,
exemplified in (36), turns out to be systematically trivial, assuming an additional pre-
supposition triggered by the preferential predicate, which is the underlined portion of
the presupposition—what we call Threshold Significance. (As Threshold Significance
is a presupposition triggered by preferential predicates in general, the lexical entry for
be happy in (26) must also be revised to include this presupposition.)
(36)  John hopesC [whoF jumped]∼C o
= λw : ∃p ∈ Q[p ∈ C] ∧ ∃d ∈ { Prefw( j, p) | p ∈ C } [d > θ(C)]. ∃p′′ ∈
Q[p′′ ∈ C ∧ Prefw( j, p′′) > θ(C)]
Threshold Significance requires that there be an element in the comparison class whose
degree along the relevant scale is higher than the threshold returned by θ . We take this
to be a general property of gradable expressions whose interpretations depend on a
threshold, including the positive form of gradable adjectives like tall and preferential
predicates like hope. We will give an empirical and conceptual motivation for (36) in
Sect. 3.5, but let us first illustrate how (36) derives a logically trivial meaning, which
in turn leads to ungrammaticality, following Gajewski (2002).
3.4 Deriving the anti-rogativity of non-veridical preferentials
The gist of our analysis of the anti-rogativity of non-veridical preferentials goes as
follows. Given Threshold Significance, (36) turns out to be necessarily true whenever
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it is defined. This is so since whenever Threshold Significance holds, there is always a
proposition in C ⊆ Q which John prefers more than the threshold given C . We follow
Barwise and Cooper (1981), Gajewski (2002), and Chierchia (2013) in assuming that
systematic logical triviality leads to ungrammaticality. Hence, the logical triviality of
(36) accounts for its ungrammaticality. On the other hand, hope with a declarative
complement, as in (35), is not logically trivial, regardless of Threshold Significance.
This is so because whether the assertion of (35) is true depends on whether or not
John prefers the particular proposition mentioned in the declarative complement (i.e.,
that Alice jumped), and Threshold Significance does not guarantee that he does. This
explains the anti-rogativity of non-veridical preferential predicates like hope.
Moving on to veridical preferentials, we note that they do not induce logical triviality
regardless of the complement clause type, due to the veridical restriction on existential
quantification. The assertion of be happy with an interrogative complement in (28)
above is non-trivial (regardless of Threshold Significance) since its truth is contingent
on whether John prefers a true answer. That is, even when Threshold Significance
is met, the assertion of (28) can be false if John prefers a false answer rather than
a true answer. Also, similarly to the non-veridical case, be happy with a declarative
complement as in (31) is non-trivial because the quantification over answers has a
singleton domain. Whether (31) is true depends on whether John prefers the particular
proposition that is in the ordinary semantic value of the declarative complement.
Regarding the precise relationship between logical triviality and ungrammaticality,
we assume the following principles from Gajewski (2002), where (37a) is modified
from the original to encompass presuppositional denotations.
(37) a. An LF constituent a of type t is L- analytic iff a’s logical skeleton
receives the same truth-value under every variable assignment where the
denotation is defined.
b. A sentence is ungrammatical if its Logical Form contains an L-analytic
constituent.
Here, we also need the definition of logical skeletons, in which all non-logical vocab-
ularies are represented as variables. Defining logical vocabularies in general is beyond
the scope of this paper; we will simply assume that the logical skeletons of sentences
with a matrix predicate embedding a clausal complement look as follows:
(38) a. [ α [VP pred [CP ϕ[βF ]]∼ ] ] (declarative complementation)
b. [ α [VP pred [CP Q ϕ[whF ]]∼ ] ] (interrogative complementation)
Here, all Greek letters—α (the subject),  (the comparison class), ϕ (the complement),
and β (the focused item)—are variables, while all other items—pred, Q, wh, and
the operator ∼—are logical vocabularies.13 Also, we assume that a logical skeleton
represents a focus structure, and ϕ[βF ] indicates that ϕ contains an occurrence of β
13 A potential problem here is that there is no known definition of ‘logical vocabularies’ under which
hope is categorized as one. Following van Benthem (1989), Gajewski (2002) defines logical vocabularies
in terms of permutation invariance, but our denotation of hope does not satisfy this criterion, as it depends
on, e.g., the world of evaluation. In this paper, we do not attempt to offer a definition of logical vocabularies
under which hope and other attitude predicates can be categorized as logical (see Abrusán 2019 for a recent
review on the issue of delineating the boundary between logical and non-logical vocabularies in general).
123
The *hope-wh puzzle
as a focus. The operator Q in (38b) is the interrogative operator, which will be defined
in Sect. 4.1.
According to the definition in (37a), the declarative version of the logical skeleton,
i.e. (38a), is not L-analytic, regardless of whether the embedding preferential predicate
pred is veridical or non-veridical. This is so since the truth of the LF depends on
whether α’s referent prefers the specific proposition mentioned in ϕ. On the other
hand, the interrogative version of the logical skeleton, (38b), is L-analytic if pred
is a non-veridical preferential predicate (e.g. hope) with Threshold Significance. If
the truth value of (38b) is defined, i.e., if its presupposition—in particular Threshold
Significance—is met, (38b) is always true regardless of the assignments for the free
variables. This is so since the semantics of a non-veridical preferential pred is such
that it returns true whenever there is a proposition in the comparison class that exceeds
the threshold.
Before concluding this section, we would like to comment on Anand and Hac-
quard’s (2013) proposal that the lexical semantics of emotive doxastics (a subtype of
non-veridical preferentials) such as hope and fear not only involves the preferential
component but also the doxastic condition that the subject considers the prejacent pos-
sible. Prima facie, this proposal might appear incompatible with our analysis since the
doxastic condition can be seen as providing a restriction on the existential quantifica-
tion, just as the veridical restriction does in veridical predicates. However, this is not
the case, as the doxastic condition provides a restriction on the comparison class as a
whole. That is, we propose the following rendition of our entry for hope to incorporate
Anand and Hacquard’s (2013) doxastic condition (the underlined part corresponds to
the doxastic condition):
(39) hopeC o = λQ
̂〈s,t〉.λx .λw : ∃p∈ Q[p ∈ C] ∧ ∃d ∈
{ Prefw(x, p) | p ∈ C } [d > θ(C)] ∧ ∀p′ ∈ C[Doxwx ∩ p′ = ∅]. ∃p′′ ∈
Q[p′′ ∈ C ∧ Prefw(x, p′′) > θ(C)]
In this entry, the comparison class C is restricted to those alternatives that are com-
patible with the subject’s beliefs. Threshold Significance then states that there is an
element in this restricted domain C that exceeds the subject’s standard threshold for
preference. Given these presuppositions, the assertion of hope with an interrogative
complement remains trivial.
Interpretations of declarative-embedding sentences provide evidence for different
ways in which the veridicality of veridical preferential predicates and the doxastic
condition of emotive doxastics are encoded. In (40a), John’s preference for Alice’s
jumping is compared to alternative propositions that are false at the evaluation world.
In contrast, in (40b), John’s preference for Alice’s jumping is compared only to those
alternatives that he considers possible at the evaluation world.
Footnote 13 continued
Rather, just as in Theiler et al. (2019) and Mayr (2019), our focus is to present an analysis of the selectional
restriction of certain clause-embedding predicates in terms of L-analyticity, assuming that these predicates
can be categorized as logical vocabularies given a suitable definition.
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(40) a. John is happy that ALICE jumped.
b. John hopes that ALICE jumped.
This suggests that the veridicality of be happy does not place a restriction on the
comparison class itself, whereas the doxastic condition of hope does, as in our lexical
entry in (39). Thus, the doxastic condition of emotive doxastics proposed by Anand
and Hacquard (2013) is compatible with our analysis of their anti-rogativity since the
condition restricts the comparison class as a whole. In the rest of the paper, we omit
the doxastic condition in our analysis of hope for the sake of simplicity, but it can be
added back in without any unwelcome consequences.
3.5 Motivations for Threshold Significance
Our explanation of the anti-rogativity of non-veridical preferential predicates makes
crucial use of Threshold Significance. In this section, we give empirical and conceptual
motivation for Threshold Significance in preferential predicates such as be happy and
hope.
Empirical support for Threshold Significance comes from the following kind of
example.
(41) (Context: There is no particular student John wants to sing. John knows
which student will sing.)
#John {isn’t happy about/doesn’t like} which student will sing.
If it were not for Threshold Significance, the sentence in (41) would be true given
the context. That is, in the given context, it’s not true that John’s preference singles
out one student, so if it were not for Threshold Significance, the sentence should be
judged true. But instead it appears to presuppose the existence of a student that John
preferred to sing.14
Conceptually, Threshold Significance can be motivated based on how pragmatic
considerations affect the choice of the threshold. In particular, Qing and Franke (2014)
and Lassiter and Goodman (2017) present a game-theoretic analysis of the semantics
of gradable adjectives, where the choice of the threshold is determined by how much
it contributes to the communicative utility of using the adjective. From this pragmatic
perspective, Threshold Significance is quite natural. Here is why. Suppose we choose
14 It is not straightforward to give a parallel empirical argument for Threshold Significance with anti-
rogative predicates like hope. Indeed, the following sentence sounds infelicitous given the context.
(i) (Context: there is no student John wants to sing.)
#John doesn’t hope that ALICE will sing.
However, this might be due to focus. That is, focus induces the presupposition that some alternative is true,
which projects through negation (e.g., Tonhauser et al. 2013).
Relatedly, note that our analysis is consistent with the fact that (i) is felicitous with a different focus
structure, for example, a broad focus on the entire complement clause. This is so because a different focus
structure would induce a different set of alternatives, and thus it is possible for Threshold Significance
to be met with respect to that set of alternatives while the situation in (i) holds. For example, Threshold
Significance with respect to the broad focus is satisfied if John prefers Alice not to sing, which is compatible
with the situation given.
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a threshold such that Threshold Significance is not satisfied. That is, every degree in
the comparison class is below the threshold. Choosing such a threshold will be useless
for communicative purposes since it does not allow us to draw any distinction in the
comparison class. Using a more concrete example, if the threshold for tallness is known
to exceed the height of any individual in the comparison class, uttering x is tall is useless
since it will always be false. Thus, Threshold Significance can be thought of as a natural
consequence of the pragmatic reasoning about thresholds. Qing and Franke (2014)
further argue that the consideration about the optimal communicative success drives
the semantic conventionalization of a certain threshold within a linguistic community
in the long run. According to this view, it is plausible that a general principle like
Threshold Significance enters into the semantic convention.
One might think that a predicate like be indifferent (about), exemplified in (42), is
a problem for our claim, as it is compatible with a situation as described in (41).15
(42) John is indifferent about which student will sing.
However, there is an important difference between predicates like hope and be happy
on the one hand and predicates like be indifferent on the other. The former involve
comparison of propositions while the latter involves comparison of questions. The fact
that be indifferent concerns comparison of questions can be supported by the fact that
it is marginal at best with declarative complements:
(43) a.??John is indifferent that Alice will sing.
b. John is indifferent about whether Alice will sing.
c. John is indifferent about who will sing.
Given that be indifferent involves comparison of questions, the focus value relevant
for sentences like (42) is a set of questions, rather than a set of propositions. Thus,
Threshold Significance in the case of (42) would require that there is a question that
John is indifferent about to an extent higher than the threshold. This is compatible
with the situation described in (41).
4 Refining the analysis
The previous section outlined our analysis of the anti-rogativity of non-veridical prefer-
ential predicates. However, this analysis still contains loose ends that must be tightened.
Specifically, it has empirical problems concerning the treatment of (i) focused non-
wh-items in an interrogative clause, and (ii) exhaustivity of embedded questions. In
this section, we discuss how our analysis can be refined to deal with these problems.
4.1 Selective focus sensitivity
The first issue concerns the treatment of focus-semantic values of wh-clauses. The
analysis in Sect. 3 hinges on the assumption that the focus-semantic value of a wh-
clause is derived from varying the value corresponding to the wh-phrase, resulting in a
15 We thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing out the relevance of predicates like be indifferent.
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set equivalent to the Hamblin-semantic value of the clause. However, the compositional
mechanism of focus interpretation assumed in Sect. 3 does not guarantee this. In
particular, it predicts that stressed non-wh-constituents can also contribute to the focus-
semantic value of a wh-clause. Romero (2015) uses the following kind of pair to
illustrate the fact that this is an undesirable feature:
(44) a. Lisa is happy about when JOHN taught syntax.
b. Lisa is happy about who taught syntax on TUESdays.
The two sentences in (44) are not intuitively equivalent. However, the compositional
mechanism of focus interpretation in Sect. 3 predicts them to be equivalent because
any focus in the complement is predicted to contribute to its focus-semantic value,
regardless of whether it is on a wh-word or not.
Romero (2015) addresses this problem using the mechanism of selective focus
binding from Wold (1996). Here, we will present a solution along the same lines.
The basic idea is to allow certain focus-sensitive operators to have selective focus
sensitivity by indexing each focus-bearing constituent. In the case of wh-clauses, we
posit a Q(uestion)-operator that must be co-indexed with a wh-element. The overall
system then predicts that the focus value relevant for the interpretation of an embedding
preferential predicate will be constrained by this requirement on the Q-operator.
In this system, a semantic value is determined with respect to two assignment
functions, g and h, where g handles the non-focus variables and h handles focus
variables. The two assignment functions have disjoint sets of indices as their domains.
We will notate the indices for non-focus variables with Arabic numerals and those
for focus variables with Roman numerals. Following Beck (2006),16 the entries of the
basic vocabulary look like the following (where ·g,ho is the ordinary semantic value
with respect to the assignments g and h, and ·g,hf is the focus semantic value with
respect to these assignments):17
(45) a.  John g,ho = j
b.  John g,hf = j
(46) a.  JOHNi g,ho = j
b.  JOHNi g,hf = h(i)
(47) a.  jumped g,ho = λxλw.jumpedw(x)
b.  jumped g,hf = λxλw.jumpedw(x)
16 Unlike Beck (2006) and following Wold (1996) and Romero (2015), we assume that the ∼-operator is
indexed and allows selective binding.
17 For which-NPs, we assume the following syncategorematic definitions:
(i) a. whichi NP g,ho = undefined
b. whichi NP 
g,h
f = h(i) if h(i) ∈  NP g,ho ; otherwise undefined.
This treatment forces the focus value of which student to exclude plural individuals (see footnote 11).
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(48) a. whoi g,ho = undefined
b. whoi g,hf = h(i)
(49) a. Qi ϕ g,ho = { ϕ g,h[x/i] | x ∈ De }
b. Qi ϕ g,hf = Qi ϕ g,ho
(50) a. α ∼i C g,ho is defined only if g(C) ⊆
{
α 
g,h[x/i]
f | x ∈ De
}
;
if defined, α ∼i C g,ho = α g,ho
b. α ∼i C g,hf is defined only if g(C) ⊆
{
α 
g,h[x/i]
f | x ∈ De
}
;
if defined, α ∼i C g,hf = α g,hf
The Q-operator in (49) is the interrogative complementizer head, which has the syntac-
tic (LF) requirement that it must be co-indexed with a wh-item inside its complement
and must not be co-indexed with any non-wh-item.
Given this setup, we can correctly analyze the declarative and interrogative com-
plements of focus-sensitive preferential predicates. The desired interpretations of the
declarative and interrogative complements are derived by the LFs in (51), as illustrated
in (52):
(51) a. Lisa is happyC [that [[JOHNi jumped]∼i C]]
b. Lisa is happyC (about) [Qi [[whoi jumped]∼i C]]
(52) a.  that [[JOHNi jumped]∼i C ] g,ho
is defined only if g(C)⊆{λw.jumpedw(x) | x ∈ De}
If defined,  that [[JOHNi jumped]∼i C ] g,ho = {λw.jumpedw( j)}
b. Qi [[whoi jumped]∼i C ] g,ho
is defined only if g(C) ⊆ {λw.jumpedw(x) | x ∈ De};
If defined, Qi [[whoi jumped]∼i C ] g,ho = {λw.jumpedw(x) | x ∈ De}
The system furthermore accounts for the fact that a non-wh focus in an interrogative
complement does not contribute to the interpretation of preferential predicates. In order
for a focused non-wh-item to contribute to the interpretation of a preferential predicate,
the ∼-operator constraining the variable C must be co-indexed with the non-wh-focus.
This could happen in the following two LFs.
(53) a. *Lisa is happyC [Qi i [[whoi saw BILLi i ]∼i i C]]
b. *Lisa is happyC [Qi [[whoi saw BILLi i ]∼i i C]]
However, these LFs are ill-formed for the following reasons. The complement
in (53a) violates the syntactic requirement that the Q-operator has to be co-indexed
with a wh-item. Regarding (53b), we predict the following definedness condition and
ordinary semantic value:
(54) a.  [whoi saw BILLi i ]∼i i C g,ho is defined only if
g(C)⊆{whoi saw BILLi i g,h[x/i i]f | x ∈ De}⇔ g(C) ⊆ {λw.saww(x)(h(i)) | x ∈ De}
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b. If defined, Qi [[whoi saw BILLi i ]∼i i C ] g,ho = {λw.saww(h(i i))(y) | y ∈
De}
What is crucial here is the fact that both (54a) and (54b) are dependent on the focus-
assignment function h. This goes against the following principle of interpretability
from Beck (2006):18
(55) Principle of Interpretability
a. An LF must have an ordinary semantic interpretation. (Beck 2006: 16)
b. An LF ϕ has an ordinary semantic interpretation only if ϕ go is defined.
The principle states that an LF is well-formed only if it has a defined ordinary semantic
value independently of a focus-assignment function. This is not the case with (54) since
both (54a) and (54b) are dependent on the focus-assignment function h (i.e., contain
free focus variables).
Finally, the system also rules out the following LF, where the ∼-operator scopes
above the Q-operator.
(56) *Lisa is happyC [[Qi [whoi saw BILLi i ]]∼i i C]
This stems from the mismatch in the semantic type of the ordinary semantic value of
the interrogative complement and the C variable. This is shown more concretely in
the following:
(57) a.  [Qi [whoi saw BILLi i ]]∼i i C g,ho is defined only if
g(C) ⊆ {{λw.saww(x, y) | x ∈ De} | y ∈ De}
b. If defined,  [Qi [whoi saw BILLi i ]]∼i i C g,ho = {λw.saww(x, b) | x ∈
De}
As seen above, the C variable is required to be a set of sets of propositions, while the
ordinary semantic value of the complement is a set of propositions. This mismatch
guarantees that (56) necessarily violates a presupposition triggered by the embedding
preferential predicate, specifically the presupposition that a member of the ordinary
complement denotation is a member of C , i.e., the third conjunct in the entry for be
happy, repeated below.
(26) be happyC w = λQ
̂〈s,t〉.λx .λw : ∃p∈ Q[p(w)∧believew(x, p)∧p ∈ C].
∃p′′ ∈ Q
[
p′′(w) ∧ believew(x, p′′) ∧ p′′ ∈ C∧
Prefw(x, p′′) > θ(C)
]
Hence, the mechanism of selective focus binding from Wold (1996) and Romero
(2015) enables an appropriate treatment of the selective focus sensitivity of preferential
predicates with declarative and interrogative complements.
18 The clause in (55b) is not explicitly stated in Beck’s (2006) original formulation. However, it is implicitly
present since an ordinary semantic value in her system is denoted by ·g , in contrast to the focus-semantic
value ·g,h .
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4.2 Exhaustivity
The next issue concerns the exhaustivity of embedded questions. Our analysis of
preferential predicates so far has only dealt with the so-called mention-some reading.
That is, the analysis states that a sentence of the form x is happy about Q is true iff
there is some true answer to Q that bears the appropriate preferential relation to x . In
fact, the mention-some semantics is crucial in the explanation of the anti-rogativity
of non-veridical preferentials in Sect. 3.4. However, what is potentially problematic
is the fact that embedded questions in principle allow a variety of stronger readings,
e.g., weakly exhaustive, strongly exhaustive, and intermediate exhaustive readings
(Groenendijk and Stokhof 1984; Heim 1994; Beck and Rullmann 1999; George 2011;
Klinedinst and Rothschild 2011; Cremers 2016). How should we account for such
stronger readings within the proposed theory of preferential predicates, and how do
they affect the analysis of the anti-rogativity of non-veridical preferential predicates?
Presenting a comprehensive account of exhaustivity in questions under different
embedding predicates is beyond the scope of this paper (see Theiler et al. 2018 for
a recent review and proposal). Rather, we will limit our attention to the kinds of
exhaustivity that are empirically attested under preferential predicates. Below, we
briefly summarize our empirical assumptions about the attested kinds of question
exhaustivity under preferential predicates, following the literature on the topic.
Our starting point is George’s (2013) argument that all available data that have been
argued to suggest weak exhaustivity, such as (58) (e.g. Beck and Rullmann 1999), are
in fact compatible with mention-some readings.
(58) Pat was happy about which students sang, but she wasn’t happy about which
student didn’t sing.
We follow George (2013) on this point, and assume that there is no mechanism in the
semantics of embedded questions that specifically derives weak exhaustivity, at least
not under preferential predicates. Instead, a mention-some reading accounts for data
such as (58).
Moving on to strong exhaustivity, although some researchers have argued that
preferential predicates disallow strong exhaustivity (Beck and Rullmann 1999; Sharvit
2002), recent literature suggests that strong exhaustivity is in fact available under
preferential predicates (Klinedinst and Rothschild 2011; Theiler 2014; Cremers and
Chemla 2017). Below is an example from Klinedinst and Rothschild (2011: fn.18)
that suggests that strong exhaustivity is available with surprise:
(59) Four students run a race: Bob, Ted, Alice, and Sue. Emily expects Bob, Ted,
and Alice to run it in under six minutes. Only Bob runs it in under six minutes.
Emily is surprised who ran the race in under six minutes (since she expected
more people to).
Taking this type of data seriously, we assume that strong exhaustivity is an available
reading under preferential predicates.
Finally, although it has been argued that epistemic predicates (e.g. know) and
communication/conjecture predicates (e.g. predict) allow the so-called intermediate
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exhaustivity of embedded questions,19 there is no evidence suggesting that preferen-
tial predicates allow an intermediately exhaustive reading. For instance, no available
evidence indicates that (60) has the intermediately exhaustive reading paraphrased in
the quote.
(60) Pat is happy about which students sang.
#“For all students who sang, Pat is happy that they sang; for all students who
didn’t sing, Pat didn’t prefer that they sing.”
The absence of intermediate exhaustivity with preferential predicates is also pointed
out by Uegaki (2015) and Theiler et al. (2018).
All in all, we assume that preferential predicates allow mention-some and strongly
exhaustive readings. The former is necessary to account for data such as (58), while
the latter is necessary to account for data such as (59). On the other hand, there is no
empirical evidence that semantics should derive weak- and intermediate-exhaustive
readings for questions embedded under preferential predicates.
Given this empirical picture, what we need in addition to the analysis as it stands
is a treatment of strong exhaustivity. We follow Romero (1998, 2016) and Spector
(2007) in assuming that wh-phrases can optionally range over generalized quantifiers
(GQs) in addition to entities, resulting in a ‘higher-order’ interpretation of a wh-
clause. We propose that this interpretation of a wh-phrase is constructed by the basic
interpretation which ranges over individuals in such a way that these individuals are
first lifted to the corresponding GQs (Montagovian individuals) and then this set of
GQs is closed under generalized Boolean operations. For any set of individuals S,
the corresponding set of Montagovian individuals is given by ↑S = {↑x | x ∈ S } =
{ λw.λP〈e,t〉. P(x) = 1 | x ∈ S }. Let us denote the generalized Boolean closure of this
set by ↑S
. That is, ↑S ⊆ ↑S
, and for any G1, G2 ∈ ↑S
, −G1, G1 G2, G1 unionsqG2 ∈
↑S
, where − is generalized negation,  generalized conjunction, and unionsq generalized
disjunction.20
Concretely, the Hamblin-style question denotation involving such a GQ-
interpretation of who would look like the following:
19 The intermediate-exhaustive reading of a question embedded under know and predict can be paraphrased
as follows:
(i) Pat knows which students sang.
“For all students who sang, Pat knows that they sang; for all students who did not sing, she does not
believe that they sang.”
(ii) Pat predicted which student would sing.
“For all students who sang, Pat predicted that they would sing; for all students who did not sing, she
did not predict that they would sing.”
See Cremers and Chemla (2016), Xiang (2016), and Theiler et al. (2018) for detailed empirical overviews
on intermediate exhaustivity.
20 The generalized Boolean operators are standardly defined as follows:
(i) a. Type t is a conjoinable type.
b. If σ is a type and τ is a conjoinable type, 〈σ, τ 〉 is a conjoinable type.
(ii) Let τ be a conjoinable type, and let α and β be expressions of type τ .
123
The *hope-wh puzzle
(61) { λw.G(λx . sangw(x)) | G ∈ ↑person
 }
‘Which GQ G ∈ ↑person
 is such that G(λx .sangw(x)) is true?’
This denotation includes ‘(strongly-)exhaustified’ answers such as ‘Only Ann sang’.
This is so because the wh-phrase contains in its domain the following general-
ized quantifier: G = λPet .P(a) ∧ ∧x∈(De−{a}) ¬P(x). With such an analysis of
wh-complements in place, data like (59) can be accounted for, preserving the exis-
tential semantics for embedding predicates. The last sentence in (59) is judged
true since, in the given context, there is a generalized quantifier G such that
λw.G(λx .x ran the race in under six minutes in w) is surprising to Emily; that is, the
generalized quantifier is of the form G = λPet .P(b) ∧ ∧x∈(De−{b}) ¬P(x). Note
that this mechanism only accounts for the optional strong exhaustivity of embedded
questions, and that we need a different account for the obligatory strong exhaustivity
of questions embedded under certain predicates, e.g. be certain. See Uegaki (2015)
and Theiler et al. (2018) for explanations of the obligatory strong exhaustivity under
be certain in terms of the lexical-semantic property of the predicate.
The above idea can be implemented within the theory of selective focus binding
developed in the previous section. We first revise the definition of the focus-variable
assignment function h so that it maps certain indices to generalized quantifiers. In this
paper, we designate the capital roman numerals (I, II, III…) as those indices that are
mapped to generalized quantifiers by h:
(62) a. whoI g,ho = undefined
b. whoI g,hf = h(I ) where h(I ) ∈ ↑person

Accordingly, we have the following higher-order definitions of the Q-operator and the
∼-operator:
(63) a. QI ϕ g,ho = { ϕ g,h[G/I ] | G ∈ D〈et,t〉 }
b. QI ϕ g,hf = QI ϕ g,ho
(64) α ∼I C g,ho is defined only if g(C) ⊆ {α g,h[G/I ]f | G ∈ D〈et,t〉 };
if defined, α ∼I Cg,ho = αg,ho
As a result, we obtain the following definedness condition and the ordinary semantic
value for the higher-order interpretation of a wh-complement:
Footnote 20 continued
a. −α =
{
¬α if τ = t
λxσ1 . − α(x) if τ = 〈σ1, σ2〉
b. α  β =
{
α ∧ β if τ = t
λxσ1 . α  β if τ = 〈σ1, σ2〉
c. α unionsq β =
{
α ∨ β if τ = t
λxσ1 . α unionsq β if τ = 〈σ1, σ2〉
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(65) QI [[whoI jumped]∼I C ] g,ho
is defined only if g(C) ⊆ {λw.G(λx .jumpedw(x)) | G ∈ ↑person
};
If defined, QI [[whoI jumped]∼I C ] g,ho ={λw.G(λx .jumpedw(x)) | G ∈
↑person
}
As discussed above, this accounts for the strongly exhaustive interpretation of wh-
complements embedded under preferential predicates. Also, note that the possibility
of the higher-order interpretation does not affect the analysis of the anti-rogativity of
non-veridical preferential predicates developed in Sect. 3. This is because we have
preserved the existential semantics for preferential predicates. The embedding of an
interrogative complement under a non-veridical preferential predicate with the exis-
tential semantics we developed in Sect. 3 predicts triviality, as long as the question
denotation and the set of focus alternatives are equivalent. Such equivalence is guar-
anteed in (65).
5 Nominalization and about
One of the issues we left open in the empirical discussion in Sect. 2 is the potential
complication posed by the preposition about. As shown in (66), interrogative com-
plements under some veridical preferential predicates are optionally introduced with
a preposition like about. In fact, a preposition seems to be preferred in many cases
where there is such an option (Egré 2008; Mayr 2019).
(66) a. Max likes which students are invited to the party.
b. Max is happy ?(about) which students are invited to the party.
c. Max is surprised (about/at) which students are invited to the party.
On the other hand, the presence or absence of about does not affect the ungrammati-
cality of non-veridical preferentials with interrogative complements, as shown below:
(67) a. *Max prefers (about) which students are invited to the party.
b. *Max hopes/wishes (about) which students are invited to the party.
c. *Max expects (about) which students are invited to the party.
The data so far are compatible with the view that about in (66) is semantically vacuous
and that its distribution is purely a matter of syntax.21 Under such a view, as long as
a predicate is semantically incompatible with an interrogative complement, it cannot
embed an interrogative complement regardless of the presence of about. However,
such a view turns out to be too simplistic, once we start considering data involving
other anti-rogative predicates that allow interrogative complements with the help of
21 Grimshaw (1990: Ch. 3) presents such a view, employing the notion of theta-marking, which we interpret
to be a syntactic mechanism. According to this view, all arguments—whether nominal or clausal—must
be theta-marked. However, some heads with argument structures do not have the theta-marking ability.
Arguments to such a head can be assigned a theta-role by a preposition while semantically participating in
the argument structure of the head.
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about, as in (68), and cases involving nominalizations of non-veridical preferential
predicates, as in (69).
(68) Pat thought *(about) who will be invited to the party.
(69) a. Pat has (a) preference about who will be invited to the party.
b. Pat has (a) hope/wish about who will be invited to the party.
c. Pat has (an) expectation about who will be invited to the party.
In the rest of this section, we argue that the above data can be accounted for by
employing Rawlins’ (2013) ‘non-orthogonality’ semantics for about, but restricting
its application to traditional adjuncts. To sketch the analysis more concretely, we will
assume that there are two lexical entries for about: about
∅
and aboutR , where about∅
is semantically vacuous while aboutR is the ‘Rawlins-style’ about denoting the non-
orthogonality relation between two issues (to be elaborated below). An interrogative
CP introduced by about
∅
is allowed as long as the predicate is semantically compati-
ble with an interrogative complement, given the considerations discussed so far in this
paper. On the other hand, an interrogative CP introduced by aboutR is allowed only in
an adjunction structure. Crucially, contra Rawlins, we argue that not all clauses embed-
ded by about have an adjunction structure (and hence a non-orthogonality semantics).
A further requirement is imposed by obligatory transitivity as a lexical specification
of the predicate (Chomsky 1965). If a clause-embedding predicate is obligatorily tran-
sitive, it must merge with a complement clause, which may involve about
∅
but may
not involve aboutR .
5.1 Rawlins (2013)-style analysis of about
To elaborate on the analysis, we begin with our rendition of Rawlins’ (2013) semantics
for about. According to Rawlins, about denotes a relation between a question and an
eventuality that holds if the question is non-orthogonal to the content of the eventuality.
This is formally defined as follows:22,23
(70)  aboutR  =λQ
̂〈s,t〉.λev.λw : e ∈ Dom(Conw).¬Orthogonal(Q, Conw(e))
22 Rawlins (2013) represents a content as an equivalence relation on a set of worlds, following an earlier
formulation of propositions in inquisitive semantics (Groenendijk and Roelofsen 2009). Here, we will sim-
ply assume that a content is represented as a set of propositions, which may be denoted by an interrogative
complement or by a declarative complement, as discussed in Sect. 3.1. Accordingly, the notion of orthogo-
nality between two questions is redefined in terms of the consistency of every pair of propositions consisting
of an answer (or the complement of the union of answers) to each of the two questions respectively.
23 Here, we specify in the type specification of the Con-function that its argument is an event. This speci-
fication makes the type calculation more transparent and correctly accounts for all cases considered in this
section. However, it has potential problems in dealing with cases where the external argument of about R
is an entity, as in (i) below:
(i) The email is about whether Joanna was going. (Rawlins 2013: 341)
This problem can be avoided by defining Con as a function on entities and treating events as a sub-type of
entities, as done by Rawlins (2013).
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a. Conw(e) = the content of e in w (Conw: 〈v, 〈̂s, t〉〉; v: the type for
eventualities)
b. Orthogonal(Q1, Q2)
⇔ ∀p ∈ Q1 ∪ {W − ⋃ Q1}∀p′ ∈ Q2 ∪ {W − ⋃ Q2}[p ∩ p′ = ∅]
Rawlins (2013) assumes an event-semantic analysis of clause-embedding predicates
(e.g., Kratzer 2006; Hacquard 2006), according to which attitudinal and speech-report
predicates are one-place predicates of content-bearing eventualities. For example, talk
is analyzed as follows:
(71)  talk  = λev.λw : e ∈ Dom(Conw). Talkingw(e)
Given the entry for about in (70) and the event-predicate analysis of talk in (71), we can
analyze talk-about plus an interrogative complement as involving an event-predicate
modification. (72) describes the type-driven composition, and (73) the resulting VP
interpretation of talk about who sang.
(72) Modification with aboutR-PP
VP
〈v, st〉
talk
〈v, st〉
PP
〈v, st〉
aboutR
〈〈̂s, t〉, 〈v, st〉〉
who sang
〈̂s, t〉
(73)  talk aboutR who sang 
= λev.λw : e ∈ Dom(Conw). Talkingw(e) ∧ ¬Orthogonal(who sang ,
Conw(e))
The resulting VP interpretation in (73) is a predicate that is true of talking events
whose content is non-orthogonal to who sang.
5.2 About-PP as a true complement
The semantics of aboutR-PPs described above has sufficient flexibility to apply to
occurrences of about in the complement of other clause-embedding predicates. In
particular, Rawlins (2013) argues that aboutR appears in the (traditional) complement
of veridical preferentials such as surprise, based on the analysis of complementation
structure by Kratzer (2006) and Hacquard (2006).
However, it turns out that treating the about-PPs in complements of veridical pref-
erentials along the lines of Rawlins (2013) predicts interpretations that are too weak.
To see this, consider the following lexical entry for an emotive factive predicate under
the Kratzer-Hacquard-style analysis of attitudes:
(74) happy  = λe.λw.happyw(Hldrw(e), Conw(e)) (Kratzer-Hacquard style)
123
The *hope-wh puzzle
Under this analysis, be happy denotes a predicate of eventualities that holds of an
eventuality if its holder is in the happy-relationship with the content of that eventuality.
Here, happy is a relationship between an individual and a question-type content which
may have the kind of analysis for be happy we developed in earlier sections. However,
the point we are going to make can be made without committing to a particular analysis
of the predicate happy.
In Kratzer’s (2006) decompositional semantics for attitudes followed by Rawlins, a
that-clause serves as an eventuality-modifier that specifies the content of the relevant
eventuality. Thus, given the lexical entry for be happy in (74), we derive the following
truth conditions for a declarative-embedding sentence with be happy.
(75) Max is happy that Ann was invited  = λw. ∃e[Hldrw(e) = m ∧ Conw(e)
= {Ann was invited } ∧ happyw(Hldrw(e), Conw(e))]
This is arguably an adequate analysis of the declarative-embedding case. However,
the prediction for the about+wh case, given in (76) below, is problematic.
(76) Max is happy about who was invited  = λw.∃e[Hldrw(e) = m
∧ ¬Orthogonal(who was invited , Conw(e)) ∧ happyw(Hldrw(e),
Conw(e))]
According to (76), the sentence is true as long as the content of Max’s happiness is non-
orthogonal to the question ‘who was invited’. This incorrectly predicts the sentence
to be true in the following situation:
(77) Context: Emily is a good old friend of Max. Max is happy whenever Emily
is happy, and he is happy whenever he is with her. Their mutual friend Paul is
going to throw a singles party. Being single, Max is invited to the party. Emily
isn’t invited since she recently started dating someone from her yoga class.
Max is happy that Emily is no longer single, but he is also sad that Emily
won’t be at the party.
In (77), the proposition ‘Emily is not single’ is non-orthogonal to the question ‘Who
is invited to the party’ because the former partially resolves the latter. This means that
the truth conditions in (76) are satisfied in (77), given that Max is happy that Emily
is not single. This is so since the situation whose content is the singleton set of the
proposition ‘Emily is not single’ meets all the conditions of existential quantification
in (76). However, this prediction is not borne out. In the situation described in (76),
the sentence Max is happy about who was invited does not sound true.
What the above data suggests is that the about-PP complement of be happy does
not merely provide a content that is non-orthogonal to the content of happiness, but
rather the content of happiness itself. To capture this fact, we posit the semantically
vacuous about
∅
, and analyze be happy as selecting for a complement providing the
content in its lexical semantics, as follows:
(78) be happyC  =
λQ
̂〈s,t〉.λe.λw : Conw(e) = Q ∧ ∃p∈Conw(e)[p(w) ∧ believew
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(Hldrw(e), p) ∧ p ∈ C].
∃p′′ ∈Conw(e)
[
p′′(w) ∧ believew(Hldrw(e), p′′) ∧ p′′ ∈ C∧
Prefw(Hldrw(e), p′′) > θ(C)
]
This entry is an event-semantic rendition of our previous entry for be happy in (26),
but, crucially, with the internal argument position, pace the Kratzer-Hacquard-style
analysis. Given the semantically vacuous about
∅
and (78), we derive the interpretation
for the AP happy about
∅
who was invited as follows:
(79) Complementation with about
∅
〈v, st〉
happy
〈〈̂s, t〉, 〈v, st〉〉
PP
〈̂s, t〉
about
∅
who was invited
〈̂s, t〉
(80) happyC about∅ who was invited  =
λe.λw : Conw(e) = who was invited  ∧ ∃p ∈ Conw(e)[p(w) ∧
believew(Hldrw(e), p) ∧ p ∈ C].
∃p′′ ∈Conw(e)
[
p′′(w) ∧ believew(Hldrw(e), p′′) ∧ p′′ ∈ C∧
Prefw(Hldrw(e), p′′) > θ(C)
]
This analysis correctly captures the fact that the about-PP provides the content of the
happiness itself rather than something that is non-orthogonally related to it. Note that
aboutR cannot appear in the complement position of happy, due to type mismatch.
This is illustrated in the following:
(81) *Complementation with aboutR
!!!
happy
〈〈̂s, t〉, 〈v, st〉〉
PP
〈v, st〉
aboutR
〈〈̂s, t〉, 〈v, st〉〉
who was invited
〈̂s, t〉
Thus, this analysis captures the unavailability of the weak reading predicted by the
Rawlins-style analysis.
5.3 Obligatory transitivity
Above, we have seen that an about-PP can in principle be an event modifier involv-
ing aboutR or a true complement involving about∅. Also, we have argued that the
occurrence of about-PPs under veridical preferential predicates such as happy and
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be surprised is better analyzed as cases of true complements with about
∅
. We will
now show that the rest of the data introduced in the beginning of this section (repeated
below) can also be fully captured in this setup, once we take into account the transitivity
of the predicates.
(67) a. *Max prefers (about) which students are invited to the party.
b. *Max hopes/wishes (about) which students are invited to the party.
c. *Max expects (about) which students are invited to the party.
(68) Pat thought *(about) who will be invited to the party.
(69) a. Pat has a preference about who will be invited to the party.
b. Pat has a hope/wish about who will be invited to the party.
c. Pat has an expectation about who will be invited to the party.
In our setup, whether a clause-embedding predicate is transitive or not is reflected
in its semantic type. A transitive predicate has type 〈〈̂s, t〉, 〈v, st〉〉, just like happy in
(78), while an intransitive predicate has type 〈v, st〉, just like talk in (71). A predicate’s
transitivity can be tested independently of its compatibility with about-PPs and its
anti-rogative/responsive status. If a predicate can occur without any complement, it is
either intransitive or optionally transitive; if a predicate must occur with some kind of
complement, it is obligatorily transitive.
The predicates in (67) are all obligatorily transitive, as the ungrammaticality of the
following examples suggests.
(82) a. *Max prefers.
b. *Max hopes/wishes.
c. *Max expects.
This means that these predicates have 〈〈̂s, t〉, 〈v, st〉〉-type lexical entries. As discussed
in relation to (81) in the previous subsection, a transitive predicate is incompatible with
an aboutR-PP for type reasons. Furthermore, we have shown in the discussion above
that non-veridical preferential predicates cannot embed interrogative complements
due to the predicted semantic triviality. This is true whether or not the interrogative
complement involves a semantically vacuous about
∅
. We thus capture the ungram-
maticality of (67) observed both with and without about.
Moving on to the predicates in (68), the following examples suggest that they are
intransitive or optionally transitive.
(83) Pat thought for a moment.
This means that there exist 〈v, st〉-type entries for think. An aboutR-PP is type-
wise compatible with these entries, semantically providing a content that is non-
orthogonally related to the content of thought. This accounts for the acceptability
of interrogative complements with about in (68).24
24 It is worth noting that the notion of (obligatory) transitivity is independently invoked by Rawlins (2013)
to account for the following selection pattern involving think and believe (following a suggestion by P.
Portner, pers. comm. to Rawlins):
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Finally, the data in (69) fall out straightforwardly once we take into account the sta-
tus of argument structures for deverbal nouns. As Grimshaw (1990) famously shows,
a deverbal noun is ambiguous between an interpretation that involves a full-fledged
argument structure (complex event nominal; CEN) and other interpretations that
lack an argument structure (simple event nominal; SEN, and result nominal;
RN). The possibility of interpretations without argument structure explains the com-
patibility of deverbal nouns with an about+wh-clause, regardless of the properties of
the predicates they are derived from.
Specifically, following Moulton (2014), we assume that a SEN denotes a one-place
predicate of events, as follows.
(84)  [nP n
√
hopeC ] 
= λe.λw : ∃p∈Conw(e)[p ∈ C].∃p′′ ∈Conw(e)[p′′ ∈ C ∧
Prefw(Hldrw(e), p′′) > θ(C)]]
Here, n is the SEN-nominalizer, which existentially closes off the internal argument of
the root in Moulton’s (2014) analysis. The denotation in (84) can be compositionally
derived by assuming (a) Moulton’s (2014) analysis of the SEN-nominalizer and (b)
the event-semantic rendition of our entry for hope in (34) as the denotation of the root√
hope.25
Given this denotation for the noun hope we can account for the about+wh-clause
as an adjunct involving aboutR . The type-driven composition of such an adjunction
structure is depicted in (85), with the interpretation in (86).
(85) NP-adjunction with aboutR
NP
〈v, st〉
nP
〈v, st〉
n
√
hope
PP
〈v, st〉
aboutR
〈〈̂s, t〉, 〈v, st〉〉
who...
〈̂s, t〉
Footnote 24 continued
(i) a. Alfonso thought about Joanna.
b. *Alfonso believed about Joanna.
c. Alfonso believed about Joanna that she was clever. (Rawlins 2013: 340, fn. 5)
The contrast between think and believe here can be explained by the fact that think is not obligatorily
transitive while believe is.
25 For the purpose of our argument, it suffices that deverbal nouns have an interpretation devoid of argument
structure, as in (84), as one of the possible readings. Though see Moulton (2014) for an argument that CP-
taking deverbal nouns such as the noun hope do not have the CEN reading, i.e., they always lack an argument
structure.
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(86)  [nP n
√
hopeC ] [PP aboutR who...] 
=λe.λw : ∃p∈Conw(e)[p ∈ C].∃p′′ ∈Conw(e)[p′′ ∈ C∧Prefw(Hldrw(e),
p′′) > θ(C)] ∧ ¬Orthogonal(who... , Con(e))
Here, non-veridical preferentiality of the root noun
√
hope does not lead to any seman-
tic triviality. This is so since the content of the hope itself in (86) need not have the
form of a question; it just needs to be non-orthogonally related to a question. For
example, the content of the hope can be that Max will be invited to the party, which is
non-orthogonally related to the question of who will be invited to the party.
In sum, the initially puzzling selection behavior involving the preposition about
in (67)–(69) can be accounted for as a result of the interplay between the ambiguity
of about between the non-orthogonality reading (Rawlins 2013) and a semantically
vacuous reading, and the transitivity of the predicates.
It should be mentioned that reliance on obligatory transitivity creates a potential
problem with our analysis of predicates such as be happy and be surprised in Sect.
5.2—that is, with the notion that they can take an about
∅
-PP as a true complement.
Since these predicates can appear without any CP complement, as in (87), they must
have type 〈v, st〉 lexical entries.
(87) a. Max is happy.
b. Max is surprised.
Given the proposed analysis, this in turn means that they can combine with an aboutR-
PP as an adjunct, which might appear to conflict with our analysis of these predicates
in Sect. 5.2. However, it is possible that these predicates are optionally transitive, just
like eat, i.e., they may be able to take an about
∅
-PP as a true complement while also
optionally appearing without any complement. Treating these predicates as optionally
transitive accounts for their selectional properties, including the data in (87). Never-
theless, something has to be said about the interpretation of sentences containing be
happy+about-wh (discussed in relation to the context involving the singles party in
(77)), which suggests that the reading involving an about
∅
-complement rather than
the one involving an aboutR-adjunct is the default option. We suggest that this is due
to the Strongest Meaning Hypothesis (Dalrymple et al. 1998), a general pragmatic
principle to the effect that the strongest available interpretation is preferred. The read-
ing with about
∅
is stronger than that with aboutR unless the sentence is embedded
under a non-upward-entailing operator. Note that the possibility of optional transitiv-
ity does not pose any problem for our analysis of about-wh under nominalizations
of non-veridical preferentials (e.g., preference about who will be invited). This is so
since the about
∅
-complementation option, even if it is type-wise available, is ruled
out because of semantic triviality.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we have put forward a hypothesis that all non-veridical preferential
predicates are anti-rogative, and provided a semantic analysis that derives this hypoth-
esis using a uniform semantics of clausal-embedding predicates (Ciardelli et al. 2013;
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Uegaki 2015; Theiler et al. 2018) and a degree-based semantics for preferential pred-
icates (Romero 2015). The paper thus advances the current research into the semantic
roots of selectional restrictions (Ciardelli and Roelofsen 2015; Uegaki 2015; Theiler
et al. 2019; Mayr 2019).
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tional License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution,
and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the
source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
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